ATTACHMENT 1

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THREATS AND RESPONSES: CONSPIRACY; BRITAIN CHARGES 11 IN PLANE CASE; BOMB GEAR CITED

By ALAN COWELL; PAMELA KENT AND STEPHEN GREY CONTRIBUTED REPORTING FOR THIS ARTICLE.

The British authorities charged 11 people on Monday in connection with a suspected plot to blow up United States-bound airliners, and said investigators had discovered "martyrdom videos" and bomb-making materials in a far-reaching search of homes, cars, woodland and other locations.

At least 8 of the 11 were thought to form a hard core of bombers who planned to assemble liquid-based explosives on board airplanes and detonate them, they said.

The 11 charged, who are to be arraigned Tuesday, were among 23 people being held in the case. Of the remaining 12, one woman, who was not identified, is to be freed. The rest are to remain in custody under counterterrorism laws permitting 28 days of detention without charge, said Susan Hemming, a lawyer from the Crown Prosecution Service.

The decision to press formal charges followed days of widening public skepticism about the extent of the suspected plot, first disclosed on Aug. 10, when the police warned that conspirators had planned to commit mass murder on what one officer called an "unimaginable scale."

The information disclosed Monday gave a sense of the scope of the investigation, beginning with months of surveillance of the suspects before most were arrested on Aug. 10 that produced "highly significant video and audio recordings," said Peter Clarke, the head of London's anti-terrorism police.

Since then, he said, the police have searched "69 houses, flats and business premises, vehicles and open spaces" and recovered 400 computers, 200 cellphones and 8,000 data storage devices such as memory sticks and DVD's. The aim in offering such detail at the news conference -- at which no questions were permitted -- seemed twofold: to give the public a glimpse into the kind of evidence that was being amassed and to offset charges that the police had overreacted to a threat.

But the credibility of the allegations will not be tested until the accused are taken before a jury -- a trial not expected to begin for at least two years.

Ms. Hemming said 8 of the 11 suspects charged Monday were accused of conspiracy to murder as well as an offense under new counterterrorism laws, "preparing acts of terrorism." The charges accuse them of planning "to smuggle the component parts of improvised explosive devices onto aircraft and assemble and detonate them on board."

The three others were charged with lesser offenses under counterterrorism legislation dating to 2000, Ms. Hemming said.

The extent of the charges raised new speculation about the plot, possibly suggesting that it was more limited than indicated by the sweep of the first arrests. Of an initial 24 arrested, only 8 were charged Monday with the most serious offenses.

The 11 charged suspects do not include all of those on a list issued earlier by the Bank of England of people whose assets were being frozen as part of the inquiry. For example, they do not include Tayib Rauf of Birmingham, whose brother Rashid Rauf was arrested by Pakistani authorities who said they suspected him of being a "key player."

Ms. Hemming said the authorities had not decided whether to seek the further detention of any of the suspects still being held without charge. Under counterterrorism laws, the authorities must apply to a High Court judge by Wednesday to detain them for another seven days.

A police official, who insisted on anonymity because the case was still unfolding, said it was possible that more people would be charged with conspiracy. Under British law, people who have been charged may not be interviewed further by the police, unlike those held under the 28-day counterterrorism law.

So far, Mr. Clarke said, the police have found bomb-making chemicals, including hydrogen peroxide and electrical components, recalling earlier British and American accounts that there was a plan to mix liquids into an explosive cocktail once they had been carried aboard airliners heading for American cities.

Mr. Clarke went on to say: "We have also found a number of video recordings -- these are sometimes referred to as martyrdom videos. This has all given us a clearer picture of the alleged plot."

After the London Transport bombings of July 7, 2005, two of the four attackers, who killed 52 people, were shown in videos warning that more attacks would follow.

Although the July 7 bombings and further attempts two weeks later, on July 21, caused deep anxiety, little information has emerged about the extent of the continuing terrorist threat. No criminal charges have been brought in connection with the July 7 bombings, and there are tight legal restrictions preventing British news organizations from reporting details of other suspected plots, for fear of prejudicing trials.

Mr. Clarke offered no prospect of a quick solution to the latest case.

"The meticulous investigation of all this material will take many months," he said, referring to the seizure of documents and computer data taking up 6,000 gigabytes. "All the data will be analyzed. There will be thousands of forensic examinations and comparisons. Fingerprints, DNA, electronic data, handwriting comparisons, chemical analysis and indeed the full range of

forensic disciplines will be used."

In discussing the case in public, the police trace a fine line between seeking to convince the public of the threat they face and avoiding prejudicing the suspects' trial.

Currently the British police are embroiled in one major terrorism trial under way and a second that is to open in October, when five suspects face charges related to the failed bombings on July 21, 2005.

The 11 suspects who were charged Monday seemed to be mostly British Muslims of Pakistani descent, but one was identified as Umar Islam, also known as Brian Young, a convert to Islam. Another was Ibrahim Savant, also a convert.

The eight people charged with conspiracy to murder were also charged with planning "to smuggle the component parts of improvised explosive devices onto aircraft and assemble them and detonate them on board."

The three others include the youngest suspect, a 17-year-old -- whose name was not released because of British legal restrictions on identifying minors -- accused of possession of "a book on improvised explosives devices, some suicide notes and wills with the identities of persons prepared to commit acts of terrorism and a map of Afghanistan containing information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism."

They also include a woman, Cossar Ali, and a man called Mehran Hussain, who were accused of failing to disclose information that could prevent an act of terrorism.

Mr. Hussain was charged with failing to tell the authorities what he knew about Nabeel Hussain, one of the 11 people still held without charge under the counterterrorism laws. The charge against Mehran Hussain dated to Sept. 23, 2005, suggesting that he had been under surveillance since then.

Ms. Ali was accused of failing to divulge information about Ahmed Abdullah Ali, also known as Abdullah Ahmed Khan, widely reported in British newspapers to be her husband. He is one of the eight accused of conspiracy to murder.

Those eight were, in addition to Mr. Ali, Adam Khatib, Ibrahim Savant, Waheed Zaman, Tanvir Hussain, Umar Islam, Arafat Waheed Khan and Assad Ali Sarwar.

ATTACHMENT 2

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August 13, 2006

Tracing Plots, British Watch, Then Pounce

By PHILIP SHENON and NEIL A. LEWIS

Correction Appended

WASHINGTON, Aug. 12 — The disclosure that British officials conducted months of surveillance before arresting 24 terrorism suspects this week highlighted what many terrorism specialists said was a central difference between American and British law enforcement agencies.

The British, they say, are more willing to wait and watch.

Although details of the British investigation remain secret, Bush administration officials say Britain's domestic intelligence agency, MI5, was for at least several months aware of a plot to set off explosions on airliners flying to the United States from Britain, as well as the identity of the people who would carry it out.

British officials suggested that the arrests were held off to gather as much information as possible about the plot and the reach of the network behind it. Although it is not clear how close the plotters were to acting, or how capable they were of carrying out the attacks, intelligence and law enforcement officials have described the planning as well advanced.

The Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have suggested in the past that they would never allow a terrorist plot discovered here to advance to its final stages, for fear that it could not be stopped in time.

In June, the F.B.I. arrested seven people in Florida on charges of plotting attacks on American landmarks, including the Sears Tower in Chicago, with investigators openly acknowledging that the suspects, described as Al Qaeda sympathizers, had only the most preliminary discussions about an attack.

"Our philosophy is that we try to identify plots in the earliest stages possible because we don't know what we don't know about a terrorism plot," Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales said at the time. "Once we have sufficient information to move forward with a prosecution, that's

what we do."

The differences in counterterrorism strategy reflect an important distinction between the legal systems of the United States and Britain and their definitions of civil liberties, with MI5 and British police agencies given far greater authority in general than their American counterparts to conduct domestic surveillance and detain terrorism suspects.

Britain's newly revised terrorism laws permit the detention of suspects for 28 days without charge. Prime Minister Tony Blair's government had been pressing for 90 days, but Parliament blocked the proposal. In the United States, suspects must be brought before a judge as soon as possible, which courts have interpreted to mean within 48 hours. Law enforcement officials have detained some terrorism suspects designated material witnesses for far longer. (The United States has also taken into custody overseas several hundred people suspected of terrorist activity and detained them at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, as enemy combatants.)

At the same time, Britain has far stricter contempt-of-court laws intended to prevent the prejudicing of trials. Anything that is said or reported about the suspects rounded up this week could, the police contend, prejudice their trial and prevent their prosecution.

Andrew C. McCarthy, a former terrorism prosecutor at the Justice Department, said he believed that British authorities were willing to allow terrorist plots to progress further because, if an attack appeared imminent, they could immediately round up the suspects, even without formal criminal charges.

"They have this fail-safe," he said. "They can arrest people without charging them with a crime, which would make a big difference in how long you'd be willing to let things run." He said F.B.I. agents, who are required to bring criminal charges if they wanted to arrest a suspect, had a justifiable fear that they might be unable to short-circuit an attack at the last minute.

There is a difference, too, in how information is shared, with American law enforcement officials typically communicating much more fully with the news media and other agencies than their British counterparts do.

In one case in particular, last year after the London bombings when New York police officers traveled there to pitch in, the different working style created tension. British police and intelligence officials complained to the F.B.I., C.I.A. and State Department after the New York officers, used to speaking more openly, gave interviews to the press in London and sent information on to their headquarters in New York, where officials then held a news conference with some details about the investigation, according to one senior American official involved in

the relationship with British agencies.

While American officials say they do not believe there were any serious compromises of the investigation, the British were extremely upset. "They don't want us to share so widely," the senior American official said.

A senior federal law enforcement official said MI5 also had a distinct advantage over the F.B.I. in that it had a greater store of foreign-language speakers, giving British authorities greater ability to infiltrate conspiracy groups. The F.B.I. still has only a handful of Muslim agents and others who speak Arabic, Urdu or other languages common in the Islamic world.

Justice Department officials and others involved in developing American counterterrorism strategies, however, say it is wrong to suggest that the F.B.I. always moves hurriedly to arrest terrorism suspects, rather than conduct surveillance that may lead to evidence about other conspirators and plots.

On Saturday, as news reports surfaced describing significant disagreements between British and American officials over the the timing of the arrests in the bombing plot, Frances Fragos Townsend, the president's homeland security adviser, said in a statement: "There was unprecedented cooperation and coordination between the U.S., U.K. and Pakistan officials throughout the case and we worked together to protect our citizens from harm while ensuring that we gathered as much information as possible to bring the plotters to justice. There was no disagreement between U.S. and U.K. officials."

John O. Brennan, a former official of the Central Intelligence Agency who set up the government's National Counterterrorism Center two years ago, said in an interview that he had been involved in a number of recent cases — most of them still classified — in which the F.B.I. had placed suspected terrorists under surveillance rather than rounding them up.

He said the bureau's willingness to wait reflected a new sophistication as supervisors adapted to the rhythm of terrorism investigations. "Especially given the history of 9/11, of course the bureau wants to move quickly and make sure there is no risk of attack," he said. "But over the past two years, I think the bureau has become much more adept at allowing these operations to run and monitor them."

But others are less certain that the bureau has overcome its traditional desire to make quick arrests.

Daniel Benjamin, a counterterrorism specialist in the National Security Council in the Clinton

administration, said the apparent success of the British surveillance operation — and the failure of the F.B.I. to identify and disrupt any similar terrorist cell in the United States since Sept. 11 — argued for creation of an American counterpart to MI5. "The F.B.I. has still not risen to the domestic intelligence task," he said.

But MI5, others note, may have benefited from the longer experience of dealing with domestic terrorism in connection with the Irish Republican Army. And it has its own critics who question its strategy by noting that it had some of the suspects in last summer's bombings in the London subway and on a bus under surveillance before the attacks.

British security officials have publicly acknowledged that two of the London bombers — Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer — had been observed in connection with a different terrorist plot that was subject to heavy surveillance. But when they dropped out of sight — well before the London bombings — intelligence agencies did not pursue them because the other conspiracy seemed a much greater priority.

John Timoney, the Miami police chief who also has run the Philadelphia Police Department and served in the No. 2 post in the New York Police Department, has worked extensively over the years in Britain on policing matters. He said comparing the two country's approaches was difficult.

"First and foremost, the policing systems are completely different," said Chief Timoney, noting that in Britain the Metropolitan Police is the dominant national law enforcement agency and is served by MI5.

In the United States, on the other hand, there is intense competition between various federal agencies and between some federal agencies and some state and local forces, he said.

But neither approach is guaranteed to succeed. In June, about 250 police officers stormed an East London row house looking for chemical weapons and arrested two brothers, Abul Koyair and Mohammed Abdul Kahar. Mr. Kahar was shot and wounded during the operation. But the two men were later released without charge after the authorities failed to find any evidence linking them to terrorist activities.

David N. Kelley, a former United States attorney in Manhattan who has overseen a range of international terrorism cases, including prosecuting the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, said, "The real challenge in law enforcement when you have a plot like that is when do you pull the trigger."

He also said that the longer investigators waited to take down a case, the risks that they might lose track of suspects increased, even if the plotters were under 24-hour surveillance.

"People think when you have someone under surveillance, it's a fail-safe, but losing someone is a real fear in these things," he said. "It's not like television. It's a real juggling act. You've got to keep a lot of balls in the air and not let any of them drop."

Lowell Bergman contributed reporting from Berkeley, Calif., for this article, Alan Cowell from London, and William K. Rashbaum from New York.

Correction: Aug. 22, 2006

A front-page article on Aug. 13 about the differences between the United States and Britain in dealing with terror plots referred incorrectly to the involvement by members of the New York City Police Department in the investigation into last year's subway bombings in London. Although four New York officers were sent after the bombings, and one New York officer was already in London as a liaison to Scotland Yard, their role was limited to looking for lessons that could be applied to protecting New York from a similar attack; they did not participate in the actual investigation into the subway bombings. Also, while the New York officers studying the bombings sent information about the investigation back to their New York headquarters, they did not give interviews to the media in London about those details. The police officials in New York who received that information allowed a group of reporters to attend a briefing for corporate security officers about the investigation; they did not hold a news conference. The article also referred incorrectly to a British law enforcement agency. The Metropolitan Police is the London police agency, not a national police agency.

ATTACHMENT 3

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

The British Way
By David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey
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Britain's **successful preemption of an Islamicist plot** to destroy up to 10 civilian airliners over the Atlantic Ocean proves that surveillance, and other forms of information-gathering, remain an essential weapon in prosecuting the war on terror. There was never any real doubt of this, of course. Al Qaeda's preferred targets are civilians, and civilians have a right to be protected from such deliberate and calculated attacks. Denying the terrorists funding, striking at their bases and training camps, holding accountable governments that promote terror and harbor terrorists, and building democracy around the world are all necessary measures in winning the war. None of these, however, can substitute for anticipating and thwarting terror operations as the British have done. This requires the development and exploitation of intelligence.

Despite this self-evident truth, critics of President Bush and the war on terror have relentlessly opposed virtually every effort to expand and improve the government's ability to gather the type of information needed to detect and prevent terrorist attacks, whether in the form of the Patriot Act's "national security" letters and delayed notification warrants (derisively described by pseudo-civil libertarians as "sneak and peak" warrants), the NSA's once secret program to intercept al Qaeda communications into and out of the United States, and the Treasury Department's efforts to monitor financial transactions through the "SWIFT" system. These, and similar measures, are among the tools that we will need to finish the job.

In celebrating the British victory -- which was achieved with assistance from American and Pakistani intelligence services -- it is worth considering some of the aspects in which the U.S. and U.K. anti-terrorism systems differ, and what lessons can be learned. Of course, we begin with the proposition that the U.S. and Britain share a common law heritage, with its emphasis on individual rights and limitations on state power, and many of the same basic political values. That said, British law, political culture and sensibilities appear to be far more attuned to the practical needs of preventing terrorist attacks than do their American counterparts. Some examples include the following:

-- Criminal Investigations: British law-enforcement officials clearly have a more robust ability to investigate suspected terrorist activity than do U.S. police agencies. This is true in a range of areas. For example, traditionally there has been much more direct cooperation between British intelligence and police services; there was never the sort of "wall" between foreign intelligence and law enforcement functions that the U.S. maintained before Sept. 11. Similarly, British officials need not meet the very strict requirement of "probable cause" to obtain warrants that U.S. investigative bodies must satisfy under the Bill of Rights. In Britain, a warrant can generally be issued on a showing of "reasonable suspicion."

In addition, the British police have certain extraordinary tools designed specifically to fight terrorism. These include "control orders" issued by the Home Secretary that not only allow the police to monitor terror suspects, but which -- although the more stringent ones are the subject of continuing legal challenges -- permit the police at the minimum to monitor and restrict terror suspect movements. These orders also enable law-enforcement authorities to identify more easily the overall pool of potential terror operatives, since the close supervision of some suspects requires their undiscovered colleagues to assume more active roles.

-- Profiling: Ironically, although today's Britain leans far more to the left than does the U.S., British attitudes toward ethnic and religious profiling appear to be far more pragmatic. In the U.S., the subject of profiling -- even as a means of allocating and concentrating investigative resources -- is highly controversial, if not taboo. In Britain, law enforcement and intelligence officials clearly target their resources on the communities most likely to

produce terror recruits, and further on the most radicalized segments of those communities. They are also able directly to infiltrate extremist mosques, community centers and Islamicist gatherings, instead of relying almost entirely on informants.

-- Privacy: Although the British virtually invented the notion of personal privacy -- the saying "an Englishman's home is his castle" can be traced at least to the 16th century -- the concept is not as broadly defined in law or politics as in contemporary America. For example, virtually all public spaces in Britain are surveilled round the clock by cameras, and the government engages in extensive data-mining operations. By contrast, in the U.S., not only have the courts created broad rights to privacy, above and beyond the Fourth Amendment's requirements, but our society has progressed to a point where individuals are considered by some to have a "privacy" interest in what can only be described as public actions -- such as giving personal information to third parties who are not bound by any formal privacy agreement, or participating in widely used fora like the Internet. Indeed, judging by some of the more extreme criticism levelled against war-on-terror policies, there are those who consider as the purest tyranny any compromise of individual autonomy to meet the community's needs.

-- Secrecy: Similarly, there is a substantial body of opinion in the U.S. which seems to consider any governmental effort to act secretly, or to punish the disclosure of sensitive information, to be illegitimate. Thus, for example, Bush critics persistently attacked the president's decision to intercept al Qaeda's international electronic communications without a warrant in part because of its secrecy, even though the relevant members of Congress had been informed of the NSA's program from the start. By contrast, there appears to be much less hostility in Britain toward government secrecy in general, and little or no tradition of "leaking" highly sensitive information as a regular part of bureaucratic infighting -- perhaps because the perpetrators could far more easily be punished with criminal sanctions under the Official Secrets Act in the U.K. than under current U.S. law.

-- International Intelligence Cooperation: The British national security bureaucracy is smaller and more tightly knit, and appears to be much less affected by the intense institutional feuds that are commonplace in Washington. Having an intelligence service operate for years in a state of virtual rebellion against its political masters -- as has been the case with the CIA during the Bush administration -- would be unthinkable in Britain.

Britain also takes a much more pragmatic attitude toward the need to cooperate with regimes, or their intelligence services, that have poor human rights records. This has periodically been an issue in both countries. The U.S. has cooperated, and does cooperate, with numerous less-than-savory intelligence services. Working with foreign intelligence services (like Pakistan's) with similar interests but questionable practices will continue to be a necessary part of the war on terror.

-- Experience: There is, of course, no substitute for experience and there is no doubt that Britain benefits (if that is the right word) from its experience in fighting IRA terror. Although the IRA was arguably a less dangerous threat than al Qaeda and its allies -- if only because the IRA eventually concluded that minimizing civilian casualties was in its political interests -- it was nevertheless well-organized, ideologically committed and vicious. For 30 years, Britain's military and law-enforcement forces investigated, infiltrated, surveilled and openly fought the IRA and won, deriving two important advantages in the process. First, Britain's armed forces and police have been thoroughly schooled in the most advanced techniques of surveillance and counter-terrorism. Second, its political establishment and population (obviously, with some exceptions) have become accustomed to the measures, sometimes intrusive and burdensome, necessary to prevent terrorist attacks.

American antiterror and intelligence capabilities have, of course, developed enormously since Sept. 11 -- and can boast a number of important successes in thwarting potential terror attacks. These include the 2002 arrests of six young men, later convicted for attending al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan; the 2003 arrests of members of the "Virginia Jihad Network" for undergoing paramilitary training; and the recent arrests of seven Miami men accused, among other things, of plotting to blow up the Sears Tower. Moreover, the existence of the NSA and SWIFT surveillance and monitoring programs indicates that the Bush administration, at least, is fully aware of the intelligence imperatives presented by the Islamicist threat.

The United States cannot, of course, adopt all aspects of the British system; our constitutional systems are really quite different. Nevertheless, there are clear lessons that can be drawn from the British experience -- especially in affording the police greater investigative latitude and in accepting some compromise of privacy in exchange for greater security. Bush administration critics often misquote Benjamin Franklin as having said that "those who would trade liberty for security deserve neither." What Franklin actually proposed was a balancing test: "They that would give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." In fighting terrorism, the British appear to have been striking that balance successfully.

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ATTACHMENT 4

A threat to the world

Stephen Schwartz

With the foiling of the alleged conspiracy by radical Islamists to devastate transatlantic air travel — at the height of the US–UK tourist season — Britain has emerged, a little more than a year after the London Tube bombings, as the apparent main target for jihadist terror in Europe.

This has little to do with British policies, poverty, discrimination or Islamophobia. Simply put, a million or more Sunnis of Pakistani background, who comprise the main element among British Asian Muslims, also include the largest contingent of radical Muslims in Europe. Their jihadist sympathies embody an imported ideology, organised through mosques and other religious institutions, rather than a 'homegrown' phenomenon, as the cliché would have it. They are symbolised by individuals like Rashid Rauf, the British-born Birmingham Muslim who was arrested on the Pakistan–Afghanistan border two weeks ago and who is now the chief suspect in the terror enterprise, and his brother Tayib, who is in custody in the UK.

Dr Irfan Ahmed Al-Alawi, head of the UK Islamic Heritage Foundation and an outstanding British Muslim adversary of the extremists, put it well at a Washington conference on Euro-Islam in June. He declared, 'Students who graduate from the Muslim schools in England and those who become extremists have the same brainwashing done to them as the Taleban. There is extremist Islam within the United Kingdom — yes, there is — and we should clean out our own house.'

I learnt about the problem of British Islam — which is unique when compared with Muslim community life in France, Germany and the rest of Western Europe — while pursuing my commitment to moderate Islam worldwide. I became Muslim in 1997 in Bosnia–Hercegovina, following a decade of reporting and writing about the end of Yugoslavia. In the Balkans I learnt about the Saudi cult of Wahabism, which aims to control all Sunni Muslims around the globe and inspires al-Qa'eda. Before and after 11 September 2001 I worked to expose Wahabism. I then co-founded a public charity, the Center for Islamic Pluralism, as a network of moderate Muslims in the US and Canada, Western Europe, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Israel, the Balkans, Turkey, Pakistan and India, and Central and Southeast Asia. But as I travelled back and forth, to Britain among other places, and spoke to British Muslim representatives in international forums, it became clear that the UK faces the most serious jihad danger of any country in Western Europe.

Imported Muslim clerics are the basis of the threat. Islam in the UK is overwhelmingly influenced by imams and other religious officials born in Pakistan and trained in that country or in Saudi Arabia. Pakistani Sunni mosques in Britain are major centres for jihadist preaching, finance, incitement and recruitment. The Islamic picture in the UK is much darker than that in Germany, where most Muslims are Turkish and, when they turn to radicalism, follow either a Marxist or a nationalist inspiration — or even that in France, where social dislocation and violent outbursts by the discontented young have produced, perhaps surprisingly, efforts by leading clerics to calm the community.

By contrast, the leaders of British Islam — exemplified by the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) — have assumed a posture of truculence, obstruction and indignation when any suggestion is made that jihadist sympathies infect their ranks. British politicians and media exacerbate this problem when, apparently baffled, they rend their garments in dismay over Muslims and converts raised to be British but turning out anti-British. The problem is not British society. British Muslim youths who enlist for jihad act not out of negative experiences of British culture or politics, but as tools in a deliberate process of indoctrination, carefully pursued by imams and agitators mainly imported from Pakistan with Saudi backing.

Unfortunately, the Blair government, notwithstanding its support for the US administration of George W. Bush, seems to be completely paralysed when dealing with this matter. I witnessed the pathetic paradigm of official Britain's relations with radical Islam at two recent colloquia held to address 'discrimination against European Muslims' (terrorism is a subject off the agenda at such affairs). One was called in Warsaw by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) last year, and the other was sponsored by the UK Foreign Office and the Saudi-financed Organisation for the Islamic Conference (OIC) at Wilton Park in May.

At the former conclave, dominated by British Muslim representatives, the Brighton-based Pakistani-ethnic imam Dr Abduljalil Sajid, of the obscure Muslim Council for Religious and Racial Harmony, blasted Tony Blair for an alleged assault on civil rights after the London bombings of July 2005. Imam Sajid entertained delegates with anecdotes of how he harassed Blair, acting out his insistence that Islam and terrorism are completely unconnected. To many Muslims present, the bombings and the radicalism that inspired them were nothing compared with the need of said Muslims (and demagogues) to appear to defy British and other Western authorities.

Perhaps more dismayingly, a London Metropolitan Police representative spoke exclusively in the idiom of political correctness. He reassured his audience that British law enforcement would go out of its way to avoid 'stereotyping' and Islamophobia, which he defined as presuming that suspects in terror conspiracies might be found among Muslims. Not one British Muslim speaker indicated that 7/7 might have created fear of Islam; rather, they argued that an exaggerated British concern about radical Muslims leads to fear, prejudice and oppression that drive Muslim youth to disaffection and violence. Thus does the aggressor assume the costume of the victim.

The Wilton Park meeting in May similarly included British Muslim speakers who, following the uproar over the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed, tried to blame tensions exclusively on non-Muslims. These included Sir Iqbal Sacranie, former head of the Muslim Council of Britain, who in 1989 suggested that death would be 'perhaps, a bit too easy' for the dissident author Salman Rushdie. Also at the conference was the Malaysian leader Dato Abd Aziz Muhammad, who spoke in support of the Palestinian terrorists of Hamas. The concluding entertainment was a rapid-fire discourse by Tariq Ramadan, the Euro-Islamist philosopher employed at Oxford, who is repudiated by many British Muslims for his links with the fundamentalist Egyptian Islamic Brotherhood and his defence of terrorism.

Professor Ramadan spoke in favour of calm in the dialogue about Islam, both from

Muslims and non-Muslims, but he also made it clear that he remains eager to condemn the Western democracies. He also figured in the least impressive attempt by the British authorities to address the challenge of Islam after 7/7: the creation by the Blair circle of the grotesquely named 'Radical Middle Way'. This is a circuit of Muslim Britain by Ramadan and other public figures, some of them mere poseurs, who offer young believers, in place of extreme radicalism, some kind of moderate radicalism, as indicated by the programme's title.

Apart from Ramadan, the risible roadshow has included a Kuwaiti jihadist, Tariq al-Suweidan, and a Californian charlatan, Joe Hanson, alias Hamza Yusuf. Hanson varies his message according to his audience: when he speaks before crowds where jihadists dominate, he proudly repudiates any questioning of radical Islam and shouts his hope that others will also 'fail the test' of moderate belief. But in meetings with non-Muslims he claims to be the number one enemy of Wahabism in the West, describes himself as an adviser to George W. Bush (on the basis of a single comment at a gathering) and postures as a spiritual Sufi.

Still, if al-Qa'eda may generally be traced to Saudi Arabia and the doctrines of Wahabism, the cancer that threatens British Islam has an essential Pakistani connection. Pakistan's military ruler, Pervaiz Musharraf, continues to promise the US and the UK that he is a firm ally against extremism, and his emissaries plead that Pakistan is an equal, if not a more vulnerable and suffering, victim of terror. But Musharraf appears impotent to do anything about it apart from the occasional arrest.

Pakistan has a level of uncontrolled Islamist bloodshed exceeded only by Iraq. Along with adherents of Wahabism, the country is swarming with fanatics of the fundamentalist Deobandi sect, which originated in India and part of which metastasised into the Taleban. The Masjid-e-Umer mosque in Walthamstow, a converted synagogue attended by at least eight of the alleged terror plot suspects, is a Deobandi institution. These homicidally inclined ideologues summon the madrassa boys to riot for the benefit of global television news. They do so at the command of political parties standing for exclusive sharia law, fundamentalist theology and aid to the Taleban and al-Qa'eda. Among these movements, some merely drench the mosques and streets of Pakistan with blood, like the infamous murder machine known as Sipah-e-Sahaba or Knights of the Prophet's Companions. Others, bearing such names as Jamaat-i-Islami (Community of Islam) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Righteous), maintain extensive international paramilitary networks.

This constellation of crime is backed by senior officers in the Pakistani army, the country's ISI intelligence establishment and other armed bodies of the state. And the entire system is imported to every country where Pakistani Sunnis reside. Whether in Britain, the US, Canada or elsewhere, these zealots silence moderates through slander and intimidation, stir militancy and intrigue against their most hated enemies: Shia Muslims first, then Jews and, of course, Christians.

It may be impossible for General Musharraf to rid his country of jihadist violence. But Britain need not and must not permit Pakistani religious gangsters to continue their control of British Islam. Britain should require that Muslim clerics be at least trained and certified in Europe, if not in Britain, according to a classical, anti-radical Muslim curriculum that reinforces loyalty to the legitimate authorities. Britain should not, out

of fear of the accusation of racism, refrain from investigating jihadism in mosques on British soil. The authorities should take the time to identify and support authentic Muslim moderates, and not be satisfied with schemes turned out on the hoof at ministerial meetings, which involve recruiting ringers for the radicals to play at reform. The alternative to such a programme of action is to encourage the jihadist assault on Britain, and further use of Britain as a base against America and the world.

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ATTACHMENT 5

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Guardian Weekly

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Comment & Analysis: It's shocking, but it's true: French Muslims identify with France more than their British counterparts. Why?

BYLINE: Timothy Garton Ash

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For anyone who has hoped and believed, as I have, that the British way of integrating Muslim citizens is more promising than the French one, the last year has been discouraging. Following the shock of the July 7 London bombings, perpetrated by young Muslims born and educated in Britain, we now have the results of two recent opinion polls, an excellent TV documentary by Channel 4's Jon Snow, and the sombre warnings of Britain's most senior Muslim policeman. All convey the same message. Not only do many young British Muslims feel more alienated from the country they live in than their parents did - that's true of Muslims from immigrant families right across Europe - but the sense of not belonging seems to be even more acute in Britain than in France.

In a poll conducted for the Channel 4 documentary, only half the British Muslims questioned said they thought of Britain as "my country", whereas nearly a quarter said they thought of it as "their country" - meaning someone else's. The younger respondents were, the greater the alienation. Shockingly, one in three British Muslims aged between 18 and 24 said they would rather live under sharia law than under British law.

In a Pew poll of Muslims worldwide, a gob-smacking 81% of British Muslims said they thought of themselves as a Muslim first and a citizen of their country only second. This is a higher proportion than in Jordan, Egypt or Turkey, and exceeded only by that in Pakistan (87%).

By contrast, only 46% of French Muslims said they were Muslims first, compared with 42% who felt themselves citoyens first.

Why is this? Here are a few possible explanations, none of which are mutually exclusive. It may have something to do with the different regions from which French and British Muslims come. I find it suggestive that the only country to top the British score was Pakistan.

And to where do most British Muslims trace their origins? Well, nearly half of them have their roots in Pakistan, and another quarter million or so in India and Bangladesh. A very large number hail from just one region: Kashmir.

Is there something about the particular religiosity of Kashmiri, Pakistani and more broadly south Asian Islam, and the way it develops in interraction with a European host culture, as opposed to the Islam of the Maghreb, from which most French Muslims come?

Then, and most obviously, Tony Blair's Britain has been the most prominent ally of George Bush's America in the Washington-styled GWOT (global war on terror), seen by many young Muslims as a GWOI (global war on Islam).

By contrast, President Jacques Chirac's France has positioned itself, from Afghanistan to Iraq and to Lebanon today, as an opponent of the GWOT/I and in some measure a friend (or appeaser, as far as American and British neocons are concerned) of Muslims in general and Arabs in particular.

There is now overwhelming evidence that Blair's foreign policy, and especially the role of British troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, has contributed very significantly to the alienation of British Muslims in general, and younger, better-educated ones

in particular. In the Channel 4 poll, nearly one-third of young Brit ish Muslims agreed with the suggestion that "the July bombings were justified because of British support for the war on terror". That's truly shocking.

This doesn't mean Blair's foreign policy has been all wrong. For example, I believe that the intervention in Afghanistan was entirely justified, because the al-Qaida terrorist network that demolished the twin towers was based in that failed state. The tragedy is that, instead of then devoting our resources to rebuilding Afghanistan, we rushed on to the neocons' war of choice in Iraq, thus creating two bloody failures instead of one possible success. But, whatever you think of the policies in detail, there is no question that they have angered young British Muslims.

I have always thought that the very undemanding vagueness, the duffle-coat bagginess, of Britishness was an advantage when it comes to making immigrants and their descendants feel at home here. After all, what have you traditionally required in order to be British? An ability to talk about the weather at inordinate length. Being willing to mind your own business, to live and let live. A general inclination to obey the law of the land, more or less. Perhaps a mild interest in the royal family, football or cricket. That's about it.

The very idea of talking about ourselves as "citizens" has seemed to the British vaguely pretentious and foreign, more specifically French - and therefore bad. But perhaps a more demanding civic-national identity, like that of the French Republic, has its advantages after all, giving a stronger sense of identity and belonging. (Whether we can change this by state-ordered pep talks on Britishness and citizenship is another question, although I do think more can be done in schools.)

Another possible reason is that Britain now has one of the most libertine societies in Europe. Particularly among younger Brits in urban areas, which is where most British Muslims live, we drink more alcohol faster, sleep around more, live less in long-lasting, two-parent families, and worship less, than almost anyone in the world.

It's clear from what young British Muslims themselves say that part of their reaction is against this kind of secular, hedonistic, anomic lifestyle. If women are reduced to sex objects, young Muslim women say, I would rather cover up.

Theirs is almost a kind of conservative feminism. Certainly, it's a socially conservative critique of some aspects of British society, particularly visible in their generation, in the urban neighbourhoods where they live.

And the critique is nuanced. Half those asked for the Channel 4 programme thought Muslim girls should make up their own minds whether to wear the hijab to school. Nearly a third of female respondents felt there was some truth in the idea that Islam treats women as second-class citizens. (The men just couldn't see it. Now I wonder why . . .) And a majority said that British society treats women with respect.

Whatever the mix of causes for this alienation, we need to escape from seeing British Muslims only through the prism of two currently prevailing paradigms: the terrorism paradigm and the backwardness paradigm.

The former starts from the question: how can we prevent our Muslims from becoming terrorists? A reasonable enough question, but if this becomes the predominant way of looking at British Muslims (Muslim equals potential terrorist), it risks contributing to the very effect it aims to avoid. The latter asks: how can we help these people to integrate better into our modern, progressive, liberal, secular society? Its implicit equation is that the hijab equals backwardness.

The idea that these young British Muslims might actually be putting their fingers on some things that are wrong with our modern, progressive, liberal, secular society; the idea that rational persons might freely choose to live in a different, outwardly more restricted way; these hardly feature in everyday progressive discourse. But they should.

Articulate British Muslims, as encountered on Jon Snow's Channel 4 documentary and in magazines such as Q-News and Emel, are not merely telling us non-Muslim Brits a lot about themselves. They are also telling us something about ourselves.

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ATTACHMENT 6

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August 21, 2006

Pakistanis Find U.S. an Easier Fit Than Britain

By NEIL MacFARQUHAR

CHICAGO, Aug. 18 — The stretch of Devon Avenue in North Chicago also named for Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, seems as if it has been transplanted directly from that country. The shops are packed with traditional wedding finery, and the spice mix in the restaurants' kebabs is just right.

Similar enclaves in Britain have been under scrutiny since they have proved to be a breeding ground for cells of terrorists, possibly including the 24 men arrested recently as suspects in a plot to blow up airliners flying out of London.

Yet Devon Avenue is in many ways different. Although heavily Pakistani, the street is far more exposed to other cultures than are similar communities in Britain.

Indian Hindus have a significant presence along the roughly one-and-a-half-mile strip of boutiques, whose other half is named for Gandhi. What was a heavily Jewish neighborhood some 20 years ago also includes recent immigrants from Colombia, Mexico and Ukraine, among others.

"There is integration even when you have an enclave," said Nizam Arain, 32, a lawyer of Pakistani descent who was born and raised in Chicago. "You don't have the same siege mentality."

Even so, members of the Pakistani immigrant community here find themselves joining the speculation as to whether sinister plots could be hatched in places like Devon (pronounced deh-VAHN) Avenue.

The most common response is no, at least not now, because of differences that have made Pakistanis in the United States far better off economically and more assimilated culturally than their counterparts in Britain. But some Pakistani-Americans do not rule out the possibility, given how little is understood about the exact tipping point that pushes angry young Muslim men to accept an ideology that endorses suicide and mass murder.

The idea of a relatively smaller, more prosperous, more striving immigrant community inoculating against terror cells goes only so far, they say.

"It makes it sound like it couldn't happen here because we are the good immigrants: hard-working, close-knit, educated," said Junaid Rana, an assistant professor of Asian-American studies at the University of Illinois at

Urbana-Champaign and an American-born son of Pakistani immigrants. "But we are talking about a cult mind-set, how a cult does its brainwashing."

Yet one major difference between the United States and Britain, some say, is the United States' historical ideal of being a melting-pot meritocracy.

"You can keep the flavor of your ethnicity, but you are expected to become an American," said Omer Mozaffar, 34, a Pakistani-American raised here who is working toward a doctorate in Islamic studies at the University of Chicago.

Britain remains far more rigid. In the United States, for example, Pakistani physicians are more likely to lead departments at hospitals or universities than they are in Britain, said Dr. Tariq H. Butt, a 52-year-old family physician who arrived in the United States 25 years ago for his residency.

Nationwide, Pakistanis appear to be prospering. The census calculated that mean household income in the United States in 2002 was $57,852 annually, while that for Asian households, which includes Pakistanis, was $70,047. By contrast, about one-fifth of young British-born Muslims are jobless, and many subsist on welfare.

Hard numbers on how many people of Pakistani descent live in the United States do not exist, but a forthcoming book from Harvard University Press on charitable donations among Pakistani-Americans, "Portrait of a Giving Community," puts the number around 500,000, with some 35 percent or more of them in the New York metropolitan area. Chicago has fewer than 100,000, while other significant clusters exist in California, Texas and Washington, D.C.

Pakistani immigration to the United States surged after laws in the 1960's made it easier for Asians to enter the country. Most were drawn by jobs in academia, medicine and engineering. It was only in the late 1980's and 90's that Pakistanis arrived to work blue-collar jobs as taxi drivers or shopkeepers, said Adil Najam, the author of the book on donations and an international relations professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

In Britain, by comparison, the first Pakistanis arrived after World War II to work in factories. Many were fleeing sectarian strife in Kashmir — a lingering source of resentment — and entire communities picked up and resettled together. This created Pakistani ghettos in cities like Bradford and Birmingham, whereas in the United States immigrants tended to be scattered and newcomers forced to assimilate. The trends intensified with time.

A decade ago, for example, a Pakistani in Chicago who wanted to buy halal meat, from animals butchered in a religiously sanctioned manner, could find it only on Devon Avenue. Now halal butchers dot the city and its suburbs.

Thousands of immigrants and their American-born offspring still flock to Devon Avenue because of its restaurants and traditional goods, including wedding saris for women and long, elaborate shirts and gilded slippers with curled toes for men. The avenue's half-dozen rudimentary mosques have a reputation for being more conservative than those elsewhere in Chicago, with the imams emphasizing an adherence to Muslim tradition.

"They go to an area where they have a feeling of nostalgia, and even psychologically it is important for immigrant communities to feel that their home country is represented," said Dr. Butt, an early member of the Association of Physicians of Pakistani Descent of North America, one of the oldest immigrant organizations here.

But immigrants are not mired in the Devon Avenue neighborhood; many move out once they can afford better. Unlike the situation in Britain, there is no collective history here of frustrated efforts to assimilate into a society where a shortened form of Pakistani is a stinging slur, and there are no centuries-old grievances nursed from British colonial rule over what became Pakistan.

Where such comparisons fail, however, is in providing a model to predict why some young Muslims turn to violence, although no religion is immune. In the United States there have been a few cases of young Pakistani men being arrested or tried in terror plots, in Atlanta and in Lodi, Calif., for example.

Ifti Nasim, a former luxury car salesman turned poet and gay rights advocate, greets a visitor with a slim volume of his works. The cover photograph shows him wearing a bright orange dress, ropes of pearls and a long blond wig. He has been in the United States since 1971.

Some shoppers crowding the sidewalks on Devon Avenue greet Mr. Nasim warmly, telling him they listen to his radio show or read his columns in a local Urdu-language newspaper. In Pakistan, Mr. Nasim says, his flamboyance would not be tolerated, but here he calls his acceptance "the litmus test of the society."

Like many, however, he has moments of doubt, saying, "Pakistani society in Chicago has made a smooth transition so far, but you never know."

A more important factor in determining who becomes a militant is most likely the feeling of being stigmatized as less than equal, community activists say, noting that such discrimination remains far more common in Britain. It is probably compounded by the fact that violence against Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Lebanon feels so much closer there, they say.

Overt bigotry is rarer here, but it exists. For instance, Mohamed Hanis, a taxi driver who is a Pakistani immigrant, said that on the Friday night after the terror alert in London, a young white man climbed into his cab. Noticing the name Mohamed, the man threatened to report that Mr. Hanis had admitted to supporting terrorist attacks unless he could get a free ride. Instead, Mr. Hanis hailed a police officer who forced the passenger to pay.

Mr. Mozaffar, the University of Chicago student, said he had grown up with revered Muslim role models like Muhammad Ali and Kareem Abdul-Jabar, but now there were none. He teaches religion classes for young Muslims, and the question inevitably arises whether the creed justifies using violence for political or religious aims. He emphasizes that Islam forbids killing innocent civilians, and community members here have said they will not tolerate a mosque prayer leader advocating violence.

Initial reports about the British suspects quoted neighbors as saying that some of the men had become more religious, adopting Islamic dress and praying five times a day. That kind of transformation happens in Chicago, too, but the idea that any such change should automatically arouse suspicion rather than be considered teenage rebellion or a religious conversion makes community activists bridle.

For the past eight years, Abdul Qadeer Sheikh, 46, has managed Islamic Books N Things on Devon Avenue, which sells items like Korans, prayer rugs and Arabic alphabet books. He says that since Sept. 11, he has seen signs of the bias that has existed in Britain for decades developing here. He describes a distinctive fear of being seen as Muslim, even along Devon Avenue. Before, a good 70 percent of the women who came into his shop were veiled, he said. Now the reverse is true, and far fewer men wear traditional clothes.

The attitude of the American government in adopting terms like "Islamic fascists" and deporting large numbers of immigrants, he said, makes Muslims feel marked, as if they do not belong here. "The society in the United States is much fairer to foreigners than anywhere else," he said, "but that mood is changing."

ATTACHMENT 7

Truckers, bus drivers on lookout for suspicious activity on roads

Posted 8/30/2006 11:23 PM ET
By Judy Keen, USA TODAY

CHICAGO — Truck driver Bill Adams scans the traffic on Harlem Avenue. "That Pepsi truck's no risk. Two empty flatbeds up there are no risk," he says. "Garbage truck is probably not a risk, but it might be if it were there at the wrong time — if it's 5 on a Sunday afternoon. You've got to think."

Adams, who drives for UPS Freight, isn't scouting Chicago's west side only for traffic hazards. He's on the lookout for terrorists.

Adams is part of a rapidly growing army of truckers and bus drivers who have been trained by Highway Watch to spot suspicious activity on the highways. The program is run by the American Trucking Association with funds from the Department of Homeland Security. Drivers take a class or watch a one-hour DVD to qualify.

Almost 400,000 people — mostly commercial truck drivers — have been trained since 2004. Membership is likely to top 1 million by March 2007. This summer, Georgia began requiring all 300,000 of its drivers with commercial licenses to be trained.

No terrorists have been nabbed, but tips helped find a missing truck carrying fertilizer, which can be used in bombs, and identified illegal immigrants at a truck-driving school.

Critics say Highway Watch is creating snoops and could lead to racial profiling. "This has the potential to be vigilante justice," says Barry Steinhardt, director of the American Civil Liberties Union's technology and liberty project. "We are in danger of turning truck drivers into barely trained, inadequate police intelligence officials" who focus on "people of color."

Hundreds of calls each month

Jim Sutton, who runs Highway Watch's analysis center, says it avoids "uncorroborated information or its use against innocent people."

Proving the value of the program is "more difficult if nothing has occurred," says Lane Kidd of the Arkansas Trucking Association. "One has to assume it lessens the likelihood" of terrorism.

Ed Crowell, president of the Georgia Motor Trucking Association, says the training not only makes drivers aware of possible terrorist threats but also helps "protect their vehicle and protect themselves from thieves."

Members phone in an average of 272 reports each month to a private toll-free number. More than half are related to security. Highway Watch analysts assess reports and share them with local and federal law enforcement.

The Highway Watch training began as a safety program and shifted its focus to terrorism after the 9/11 attacks. The program has received $45.8 million in federal grants since fiscal 2003 and expects $4.8 million this year.

Some citizens' watch programs proposed after 9/11 were abandoned. One of them, Operation TIPS, would have recruited letter carriers, meter readers and cable TV installers to report suspicious activity to the Justice Department.

Whether Adams is on his weekly runs between Harrisburg, Pa., and Sacramento or on a short trip like this one to pick up a load of kitchen fixtures, he looks for people photographing tunnels or bridges, as well as abandoned vehicles that might be packed with explosives.

He once spotted a pickup in Arizona loaded with red cans of gas. He called the toll-free number to report the truck incident. He never did find out why the driver was hauling all that gas.

"Before 9/11, you didn't pay a lot of attention to what was going on around you," he says. "You saw something unusual, you never gave a second thought that it might be a risk to security."

Adams, 43, of Willow Hill, Pa., has been driving trucks for 24 years and took the training in 2002. He now teaches the program to other drivers and trainers.

Most truckers are eager to contribute to homeland security, he says. Their No. 1 question during training sessions: "Are they going to take us seriously?"

Tracking potential terrorists

Very seriously, says Sutton, a former FBI agent who runs the program's analysis center. Using reports from drivers across the USA, Sutton says, analysts with intelligence and law-enforcement backgrounds track potential terrorist activity. For example, if several truckers report seeing someone photographing a bridge over a period of time, the analysts spot the pattern and alert law enforcement.

Sutton and four analysts on Highway Watch's payroll work at the Transportation Security Administration's operations center outside Washington. Operators in Kentucky take truckers' calls, then send details to the operations center.

Adams is wary of people who ask what he's carrying in his truck and where he's going. When he pulls behind another vehicle in traffic or a parking lot, he leaves a gap so he has an escape route if someone approaches.

He's on alert even when driving across empty stretches of Iowa. "If something changes, it stands out like a sore thumb," he says.

From the seat high in his truck's cab, Adams can see inside most cars and small trucks. He doesn't necessarily check out the occupants, he says, "but you look for what's in them."

He spots a car filled with cleaning supplies and figures the passengers work for a cleaning service. He has seen people drinking and doing drugs in their vehicles and sometimes calls 911 to report them.

Since he joined the program, Adams has called the number four times. Before the training, he says he occasionally saw activities that he now wishes he had reported.

"I don't want to be a pain in anybody's behind," he says, "so you make sure it really is a risk before you call. You use your common sense. If you aren't sure, dial the 800 number."

Adams says it also makes sense to be more vigilant on the road. "You have to have a head's up that things have changed," he says. "We all need to be aware of our surroundings."

As he maneuvers his truck along Chicago's Pulaski Road, which is teeming with people and cars, he points down a residential street. If a fuel tanker truck emerged from there, he says, he would "pick up the phone, because what in the world is a fuel tanker doing here?"

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